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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH JUDKINS, DAN J. MILLEiR, 
FRANK OBORN, and ADRIAN DE BLOOIS, 
Plaintiffs a;n,d Resp,ondents, 
vs. 
BOYD N. FRONK, 
Defendant and App-ellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant on June 6th and 7th, 1945, contracted to 
purchase real property on the Northeast eorner of 20th 
Street and Harrison Boulevard in Ogden, Utah, {Tr. 
28, 30, 90) for the purpose of erecting a gasoline service 
station thereon, (Tr. 30) subsequently receiving deed 
therefor and quieting title to ,a portion thereof. (Tr. 90) 
On June 7, 1945, he paid the fee and obtained from 
Ogden City a building permit to construct such se·rvice 
station. (Tr. 3, 31) At the time of issuance of such 
permit, the zoning ordinances of Ogden City in force 
and effect allowed use of real prope·rty in that area of 
which this property is a part, for sueh service station 
and store purposes. (Tr. 3, 4) The Building Code of 
Ogden City, in effect at the time of issuance of the 
pe·rmit to appellant, contained a provision that ''Every 
permit issued by the Building Official under the pro-
visions of this Code shall expire by limitation 8Jld be-
come null and void, if the building or work authorized 
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by such permit is not commenced within 60 days from 
the date of such permit, or if the building or work 
authorized by such permit is suspended or abandoned 
at any time after the work is commeneed for sixty days.'' 
CTr. 27) The building permit issued to appellant, had 
a provision, written on the face thereof, that "This per-
mit is void if work is not commenced within sixty days, 
or if work is suspended for sixty days." (Tr. 3, 31) 
The building Code also provides for a Board of Exam-
iners and Appeals with power to interpret its provisions, 
with specific power to interpret it in cases where a 
"manifest injustice might be done". (Tr. 3) However, 
Ogden City has never appointed such a Board of_ Exam-
iners and Appeals as so provided for in the Building 
Code~ 
In reliance upon his building permit, the appellant 
immediately commenced work and expended money to-
ward the erection of the service station. (Tr. 28) In 
August, 1945, he mortgaged his home for $1,400.00 for 
funds for the station. (Tr. 42, 49, 67) Each month from 
and including June, 1945, to and including March, 1946, 
he performed work on the premises toward building the 
station. ( Tr. 27 to 31, 39 to 68) Then, in the early months 
of 1946, he called on various lumber and supply houses 
for mate-rials and was informed that he .must have a 
Government priority number. (Tr. 51) He immediately 
made ~application for priorities to the Civilian Produc-
tion Administration, both at its Ogden and Salt Lake 
City offices, which application was denied. (Tr. 52) 
On August 12th, 1946, Ogden City passed an ordi-
nance amending its zoning ordinances to make use of 
real property in the area m which appellant's said 
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premises 'Yere located for a store or service sta.tion, a 
non-conforming- use. (Tr. 3) This ordinance was not 
retroacti Ye. ( Tr. 3, 4) 
On July 25, 1947, the controls over building mater-
ials were terminated by the executive order of the Presi-
dent of the United States, (Tr. 67, 68) but shortage of 
such ·materials and great difficulty in obtaining· them 
continued until to or after October, 1948. ( Tr. 31 to 38 
inc., 68 to 76). On October 13, 1948, a.pp.ellant, believing 
that now he cot~ld get materials, applied to the Board 
of City Commissioners of Ogden City for a renewal of 
his building permit of June 7, 1945, ( Tr. 6, 7, 56, 57} 
and after hearing had during which he expl,ained his 
difficulties regarding building materials to the Board 
of City Commissioners, (Tr. 66) this Board on October 
26, 1948, granted his application and renewed said build-
ing permit. (Tr. 7, 8, 56, 57) On November 23, -1948, 
respondents protested to the Board of City Commis-
sioners and hearing on their protest was continued to 
November 30, 1948, (Tr. 7, 8) when respondents and 
their counsel were present and appellant and his counsel 
were present, and after such hearing the City Commis-
sion refused to rescind its action in renewing app.ellant's 
original building permt. (Tr. 7, 8) 
That up to October 13, 1948, the appellant had 
expended on the land in question in relation to work in 
connection with construction of the station, an amount 
in excess of $1,200.00, and since the 26th of October, 
1948, the date of renewal of his permit, he caused further 
sums to he expended in exces.s of $900.00. (Tr. 59) 
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R,espondents brought this action seeking an injunc-
tion against appellant to res,train him from constructing 
the station and from _a judgment in their favor, appellant 
appeals. 
The trial of this ease was had by the District Court 
on the 25th day of November, 19~9, but the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were not entered therein 
until the 23rd day of September, 1950. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
BY RE1CEIVING A VALID BUILDING PERMIT 
FROM OGDEN CIT'Y, PERFORMING WORK 
THEREUNDER, AND EXPENDING FUNDS IN RE-
LIANCE THEREON, APPELLANT ACQUIRED A 
VESTED RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT A SERVICE 
STATION, AND COULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY 
A SUBSEQUENT' ZONING ORDINANCE ENACTED 
BY OGDEN CITY. 
There is no dispute of the fact that the appellant 
was issued a building permit on June 7, 1945, for the 
purpose of constructing a service station upon his land, 
and the findings of the Court so hold. It is not disputed 
that at the time of issuance, of the appellant's pe·rmit, 
it was lawful under the Zoning Ordinances of Ogden 
City to erect a service station in the area in which 
appell~ant 's land is situated. In reliance upon this peTmit., 
appellant performed a great deal of work and expended 
large sums of money prior to the time, in August, 1946, 
when Ogden City amended its Zoning Ordin~ance to pro-
hibit such use in this area, the amended Ordinance not 
being retroactive. 
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It is the over\Yhelming weight of authority in the 
United StatPs that one \Yho thus receives a valid build-
ing permit, performs \\·ork and expends money in re-
liance thereon, acquires a Yested right to complete the 
construction. The right is unaffected by subsequent 
amendments of Zoning Ordinances. 40 ALR at page 
928 states the rule as follows : 
• 'By the weight of authority a municipal 
building· permit or license may not arbitrarily 
be revoked, particularly where, on the faith of 
it, the 0\\1Jler has incurred material expense." 
There many cases are annotated which follow the· weight 
of authority. · 
In an annotation commencing at page 500 and par-
ticularly at page 505 et. seq. of 138 ALR cases are 
cited and discussed, which hold that one who has ob-
tained a building permit or license and has proceeded 
to act under it, has thereby acquired a vested right 
which is protected against disturbance hy a subsequen~t 
amendment of the Zoning Ordinance. Among the cases 
cited in this annotation at page 506, is New York State 
Investing Co. v. Brady, 214 App. Div. 592, 212 NYS 
605, where it was held by the New York Court that an 
amendment of the building zone resolution prohibiting 
the erection of a gasoline filing· station in a certain 
location did not cut off the right of the owner or lessee 
of such premises to proceed under a permit for the 
construction of such a station where the permit was 
obtained and work had been commenced thereunder and 
a large amount of money expended in connection there-
with prior to the adoption of the amendment. 
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Also, in the ease of Sande11burgh v. Michigamme Oil 
Co. 249 Mich;._ 372, 228 NW 707 it was held that after 
property in a business zone had been purchased for the 
purpose of constructing a gasoline filling station thereon 
' 
a. building permit obtained, and substantial work per-
formed thereunder, the city was precluded from re-
voking the pe-rmit and later amending the zoning ordi-
nance with reference solely to this property and was 
precluded from giving such amendment retroactive ef-
fect. 
In aiLother Ne'v York case set out in this annotation, 
Pelham View Apartments, v. Switzer, 130 Mis_c. 545,. 224 
NYS 56, it was held that one who had secured a building 
permit for an apartment house upon a site where apart-
ment houses were allowed by the zoning orcdinance 
then in effeet, and in reliance upon such permit, pur-
chased the lot, employed an architect, had the property 
surveyed, ·and exca va.ted the- cellar, could not be de-
prived. of the vested. right thus- acquired by a subsequent 
revocation- of the· permit pursuant to an amendment of 
the zoning o-rdinance. The Court said : 
' 'Where~ a. permit to build. a building has been 
acted upon, and wherH the owner has, as in this 
instance,. proceeded to incur obligations and in 
good faith to r>roceed to erect the building, such 
rfghts are then vested property rights, protected 
by the Federal and State Constitutions . . . 
Wbile it is unfortunate that the erection of this 
apartment house . may be distasteful to. pe_ople 
living in the neighborhood,. and while perhaps 
it is unf_ortunate tha.t their property should. be 
thus affected, yet the protection of such rights 
must be legally done, and the public officials 
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representing the people cannot leg:ally be per-
mitted to· change the zoning· law, and cancel a 
permit preYiousl~? issued under the original zon-
ing· act, 'vhere an innocent purchaser of real 
estate has in g·ood faith acted upon such official 
action of the city, and has thereby acquired vested 
rights under his permit. This case must he dis-
tinguished from the many· other c-ases where 
permits w·ere not obtained in good faith, but 
merely in anticipation of an· amendment to the 
zoning la,Y. The facts in the present case indi-
cate entire good faith upon the parf of the pur-
chaser, as is evidenc_ed by the large sums of 
money that were paid by him on the strength. of 
the presumed legality of his original permit. It 
would be·· nothing short of confiscation, and a 
complete disregard of constitutional rights, if a 
munic~pality could revoke a building pe-rmit is-
sued under the conditions as presented in this 
case.,., 
Likewise in another case cited in the· annotation, 
a California case which: went to- the S-upreme Co11rt. of 
the United States, Dobbins v. Los- Ange-les,, 195 US 223, 
49 L ed 169·, 25 S Ct. 18, where an a.mendme,nt. of a. 
municipal ordinance prohibiting- the erection or main-
tenance of gas works. except within certain prescribed 
limits which excluded property previously included 
therein, after it had been purchased for the purpos.e of 
erecting- gas works thereon and after s:uch erection had 
been commenced under a permit from the Board of Fire 
Commissioners., was held to be an arbitrary interfe-rence 
with property rights prote.cte_d by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and not justi-
fied as an exercise of the police power. 
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In the case of Wikstrom v. City of Laramie, et al 
(Wyoming) 262 Pac. 22, it is .stated: 
"It may, however, not he out of place in 
passing, to state that, as a general rule, where a 
City Council, or the proper city officer, in absence 
of fr1aud grants a permit for the construction of 
a building, and the party acting in the fai,th there-
of commences the erection of a building, he· ac-
quires something more than a mere license, some-
thing in the nature of a vested right, and the 
permit cannot then be revoked by the City.'' 
In the case of London vs. Robinson et al (Cal.) 271 
Pac. 921, it was held that 
a zoning ordinance enacted by a muncipality ap-
plied only from the date on which it took effect. 
In City of Lee Falls v. Fisk, 24 NYS 2d 460 (1941) 
HN 12, a prospective purchaser of real estate disclosed 
to City officials that he intended to purchase realty and 
erect a gas station thereon. He was informed there 
was no ordinanee preventing the erection of such station. 
Thereafter he purchased the realty, receiving a mort-
gage loan to finance the erection of the station, en-
.tered into a lease, notified tenants in houses located on 
the realty to move therefrom and made an agreement 
with a, wrecking company to raze· the houses. The 
Court held that the purchaser of the realty acquired 
vested rights of which he was not divested by action of 
the common council of the city in thereafter enacting a 
zoning ordianee which would prevent the erection of 
such a station on the realty in question. 
In the ease of Trans-oceanic Oil Corporation vs. 
City of Santa Barbara (Cal. 1948) 194 Pac. 2d 148, it 
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was held that a. holder of a building permit, who actually 
commenc.es \vork upon a building· and incurs liabilities 
for work and material, acquires a ''vested property 
right" \Yhich he is entitled to have protected against 
arbitrary revocation of permit, and also holds that 
"There a permit has been regularly issued and rights 
have vested thereunder, the adoption of a zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting· the permitted use of property does not 
ipso facto revoke the permit. 
Atlas vs. Dick 81 NYS 2d 126 (1948) holds: One 
\vho has merely obtained a building permit is bound by 
any change in zoning ordinance made before he pro-
ceeds with construction of building thereunder, but 
where operations have been begun and contracts let 
under a permit valid when issued permittee thereby 
acquires vested rights which oannot be taken from him 
by subsequent modification of zoning ordinance. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT DID NOT LOSE HIS VESTED RIGHT 
TO CONSTRUCT A SERVICE STATION WHEN 
NATIONAL WAR EMERGENCY LEGISL~ATION 
PREVENTED HIM FROM OBTAINING PRIOR-
ITIES FOR BUILDING MATERIALS. 
The evidence in this case and also the findings 
clearly show that the appellant exercised all possible 
effort to obtain building materials to proceed with the 
construction of the station. He went to the Anderson 
Lumber Company, Wheelwright Lumber Company, Bur-
ton Walker Lumber Company in Ogden, and also wHnt 
to Ed White Electric and Ogden Electric Company to 
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obtain materials. (Tr. 51) Finding of the Court sub-
stantiates this evidence. Although necessity for obtain-
ing priorities was terminated July 25, 1947, the evidence 
before- the court shows tha.t it was not possible- to ob-
tain many materials needed in the construction of the 
service station, such as electric wiring, steel, re-inforc-
ing iron,' cement, metal sashes. (Tr. 68, 69, 70 and 71) 
Ge-orge Ward, l\1anager of the Anderson Lumber 
Company testified that after July 25, 1947, the supply 
of cement was so short that even after July 25, 1947, 
_and through 1948, only about one-tenth of the demand 
for cement could be supplied, and that cement, upon a 
few occasions, WJas shipped from California into this 
market to help supply part of the trade. (Tr. 70) As to 
steel re-inforcing bars and metal sashes, the-y were al-
most non-existent during 1947 and 1948. (Tr. 71) 
Mr. Joseph Behling·, representative of the Salt L~ake 
Hardware Company, dealers in builders lines, build-
ers hardware, tanks machine pipe. fittings, plumbing· 
fittings and electrical equipment and wiring, testified 
that all of these articles were very difficult to obtain 
in the years 1945, 1946 and 1947, and that some of them 
started to ease off in the middle of 1948, but critical 
shortages did continue even into the year 1949, such as 
pipe and other ste-el products and tank plate. (Tr. 32-
33-34). 
The testimony of Mr. Ward and Mr. Behling is un-
eontradioted. However, even were there no such te·sti-
mony in this oase, it is a matter of common knowledge 
of which the Court may take judicial notice that critical 
shortages in building materials continued through the 
year 1948. Under such conditions we submit that it can-
not reasonably be said that the appellant did not use 
10 
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due diligence because he did not apply for renewal of his 
permit until Oc,tober 13, 1948. Very clearly it wa.s not un-
til then that an indiYidual such as the appellant, could 
reasonably belieYe that he mig-ht then stand some chance 
of getting materials. 
The findings prepared by the respondent in Para-
g·raph 13 sets forth certain construction under permits 
issued by Ogden City, "\Yhich "\Yas completed during the 
years 1945, 1946 and 1947. There is nothing in the 
record to show whether or not the builders. bad pri-
orities issued by proper authority, but it must be· pre-
sumed that they did have such priorities. 
In ParagTpah 14 of the findrngs is set forth certain 
construction "\Yhich 'vas completed during the years 1947 
and 1948. Likewise in relation to at least some of these 
where the permit issued prior to July 25, 1947, it mus,t 
be presumed that sucb building had priorities and as to 
the few remaining, it does not appear in the record how 
or where ma.terials were obtained, so tha.t these findings 
have little evidentiary weight as to the f.acts in this case. 
The building permit issued by Ogden City to appel-
lant created a contract under which appellant had a 
vested right to construct a servjce station. lie was pre-
vented from performing the time requirements jn the 
permit because of the national 'va.r emergency and his 
ina hili ty to so comply is legally excused by reason of 
the paramount war emergency. rrhe principal of law 
governing such situations is well and clearly enunciated 
in the case of National Grain Yeast Corp. v. City of 
Crystal Lake, 147 F 2d 711 (CCA ·7th 1945), in which 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals says : 
11 
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''Nor can the court, nor should the defendant, 
ignore the effect of the World War on efforts of 
parties to comply with contract obligations and 
requirements. 
'.;The extent to which parties may justifi~ably ex-
pect relief in a court of equity upon a showing 
that the failure to perform was because of in-
ability to secure priorities, etc., due to the War, 
presents a question upon which final judicial pro-
nouncement has not been made. 
"It is our belief that courts of equity Will not 
close the door of relief to a party who has dili-
gently and in good faith attempted to complete 
its contract, but who has been wholly or in part 
prevented from so doing because of the first de-
mands and requirements of the Government in 
the prosecution of the War.'' 
Also in a rec.ent case appealed to the Circuit Court 
of Appeals from the Federal District Court of Utah, 
.New York Life Insurance Company v. Durham, 166 F2d 
87 4, the Court states the following principal of law: 
''Private rights, when affected by the incidence of 
War, are governed by determinations of political 
departments of government, and courts will 
usually condition private rights whether resting 
in contract or otherwise, in order to give full 
effect to the exigencies of War." 
POINT III 
BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS OF OGDEN 
CITY HAD POWER TO RENEW APPELLANT'S 
BUILDING PERMIT. 
Inasmuch a.s appellant did not lose his vested right 
to construct the service station by reason of his being 
12 
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prevented from proceeding· because of the war emer• 
gency, most certainly the Board of City Commissione·rs 
of Og·den City had po,ver to grant renewal of his 
original permit. \V e assert that the provisions in the 
Building· C·ode, "~hich are incorporated in the building 
permit, providing against abandoning· the work for a per-
iod of sixty (60) days, or a period of one year with 
respect to a ne'v permit at half fee, are provisions de-
signed to obtain reasonable diligenee in prosecuting 
work under building permits and are analogous to stat-
utes of limitation. Provisions of limitations statutes 
may be waived and '"·e submit that for the very good 
cause of impossibility of performance due to war re-
strictions the Board of City Commissioners had the 
power to waive these time provisions and renew appel-
lant's permit. When the holder of a building permit 
is prevented from pursuing the work within the time 
specified by the paramount requirement of government 
due to war, we do not believe that it was the intention 
of the City and its Building Code to make the~ permit 
an absolute nullity because of such excusable failure to 
meet a time limitation. 
The City Commission, being an administrative body, 
has power to review the facts upon which appellant 
based his application for renewal of his permit, and 
when it determined that those facts justified waiver of 
the time limitations and renewal ·of the permit such 
determination became conclusive. The Courts will not 
review the findings of an administ]}ative body in such 
matters unle~ss there is arbitrary abuse of discretion. 
Clearly there was no abuse of discretion here. The City 
Commission held hearings at which both respondents 
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rand appellant were present, together with their counsel, 
and it was only after a careful and fair consideration, 
upon hearings had, that the Board of City Commission-
ers determined that appellant should have a renewal of 
his building permit. There being no arbitrary action 
nor abuse of d~scretion by this administrative body, we 
submit tha.t its determination is final and cannot be 
reviewed by the· courts. 
T~e law in this regard is succinctly stated by Mc-
Quillin on Municipal Corporations in Volume 1, Second 
Edition, Paragraph 390, Page 1068 as follows: 
''Assuming that the municipal authorities have 
acted within the orbit of their lawful authority, 
no principle of law is better established than that 
courts will not sit in review of proceedings of 
municipal officers and departments, especially 
those involving legislative discretion, in the ab-
sence of had faith, fraud, arbitrary action or 
. abuse· of power.'' · 
This rule is so well established that it would he a 
work of supererogation to cite the voluminous number 
of cases supporting the rule. For other general state-
ments of the rule, we refer the Court to 42 American 
Jurisprudence, Paragraph 209, Page 610, et. seq., and 43 
AmeTican Jurisprudence, Paragraph 255, pages 72, 73. 
One of the many cases stating the rule is that of Henry 
Bennett et al vs. State Corporation Commission, 142 
Pae. 2d 810, 150 ALR 1140, a Kansas case, which holds: 
''In the ahs-ence of arbitrary or capricious 
action or .abuse of discretion by executive or ad-
mini;s·trative offieers, courts do not interfere 
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"~ith the performance of their acts which are dis-
cretionary in character or involve the e·xerc.ise 
of judgment.'' 
The Building ('iode of Ogden City in effect a.t the 
time appellant obtained his building permit, provided. 
for a. Board of Eocaminers and Appeals, which would 
have po"""er to grant relief 'vith respect to the require-
ments of building· permits in rases where a manifest in-
justice would be done. No such Board has ever been 
appointed by Ogden City as is found in Finding 11 of 
the District Court. Had there been such a Board of 
Appeal, appellant might haYe gone before it and sought 
relief with respect to renewel of his building permit, 
because of the manifest injustic-e which would be done 
him should the impossible be required of his complying 
with the time provisions in the permit when prevented 
from doing· so by the Government requirements for pri-
orities. There being no such Board of Appeal, most 
assuredly the City Commission of Ogden City could 
exercise such power as might have been exercised by 
such subordinate Board had one been in existence. Thus 
the City Commission very clearly acted within its powe-rs 
in granting appellant relief by renewing the original 
permit. 
There was in existence a Board of Adjustme·nt in 
Ogden City as provided by Section 15-8-95, Laws of 
Utah (1943), and respondents may argue that appell-
ant should have applie·d to that Board. However, such 
Board of Adjustment has no power to determine mat-
ters pertaining to use of property under zoning ordi-
nances, nor matters pertaining to renewal of building 
permits and, therefore, such Board of Adjustment 
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would have had no power to hear appellant nor grant 
him any relief had he gone before it. The law with 
respect to this is found in the case of Walton vs. Tracy 
Loan and Trust Company, 97 Utah 249, 92 Pac. 2d 724 
. ' 
where the limitations of power of such Boards of Ad-
justment were adjudicated by this Court. 
POINT IV 
APPELL·ANT DID NOT ABANDON THE IN-
TENDED CONSTRUCTION OF THE SERVICE 
STATION. 
There is no finding by the District Court that the 
appellant, Boyd N. Fronk, ever abandoned construction 
of the Service Station, nor does the evidence support 
a conclusion of law of abandonment. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT E,RRED IN GRANTING 
AN INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE. 
Respectfully submitted 
SAMUEL C. POWELL 
614 David Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE 
502 David Eccles Building 
Ogden, U,tah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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